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Abstract
Background: The aim of the study was to verify the hypothesis that additional information about the perpetrator responsible 
for the death of subordinates at the workplace may influence the assessment of morality. The article contains the results of an 
empirical study conducted among young adult working Silesians (N = 262), who were asked to evaluate the morality of the per-
son responsible for the decision, in line with which miners had started working on 6th October 2014. On that day miners died 
following an explosion in the “Mysłowice-Wesoła” methane mine in the Polish Silesia region. Material and Methods: The study 
explored the stories’ method (from the moral psychology domain) as well as a  short questionnaire. The respondents received 
information about the behavior of the perpetrator as well as emotions (socially desirable and undesirable) and (socially desirable 
and undesirable) views in the form of brief descriptions (stories). They were asked to evaluate the perpetrator’s morality. Results: 
The socially desirable views of the evaluated perpetrator (lack of acceptance for the situation) and the socially desirable emotions 
(guilt) significantly increased the level of morality according to participants. A single piece of information about the socially 
desirable emotions didn’t significantly increase the perceived level of perpetrator’s morality; neither did a single piece of infor-
mation about socially desirable views. Conclusions: Results indicate the important role of additional information about emo-
tions and views of the perpetrator in the process of assessing morality. It is worthwhile to implement the practical implications  
of this study in similar crisis situations at the workplace. Med Pr 2018;69(4)
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JUDGMENT OF THE MORALITY 
OF AN INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE 
FOR A FATAL WORKPLACE ACCIDENT 
INVOLVING SUBORDINATES
ORIGINAL PAPER
INTRODUCTION
On 6 October 2014, methane exploded in the “Mysło-
wice-Wesoła” mine, leaving 37 miners dead or injured. 
After the explosion, the media reported that the person 
responsible for the relevant decision had conscious-
ly ordered the miners to commence work despite the 
elevated risk, focusing on the economic aspects of the 
mine’s operation.
On the grounds of the concept of moral integrity 
and the lack thereof [1–3], which emphasizes not only 
the role of behavior but also that of the views expressed 
and the emotions felt by the perpetrator when it comes 
to judging morality, a  study was conducted among 
young working adults living in Silesia (N = 262), who 
were asked to judge the morality of the person respon-
sible for the decision ordering the miners to go under-
ground to work, leading to deaths and injuries. This pa-
per contains the findings from the said study, with an 
indication of the latter’s limitations and of the practical 
implications that may find application in similar criti-
cal situations at work.
A number of analyses have been conducted in the 
field of moral psychology concerning factors import-
ant in the process of making decisions concerning 
other people’s morality. For example, the significant 
role of the emotions felt and of the views expressed 
by the other person was demonstrated when it came 
to judging morality  [3]. In spite of that, the literature 
lacks research concerning the aspects discussed here, 
in the context of disasters, in a particular place of work 
in Silesia, namely an underground mine with methane 
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explosion, flooding and tremor hazards. Although we 
judge the morality of people around us on a daily ba-
sis and we are capable of expressing opinions about it 
within 200–250 ms [4], fatal accidents at work represent 
very particular situations as far as moral decisions are 
concerned.
Firstly, contributing to someone else’s death is con-
sidered a  very serious offense in most cultures, while 
manslaughter is described from the angle of the uni-
versal hierarchy of values in the world  [5]. Secondly, 
the critical situation in the “Mysłowice-Wesoła” mine 
described here concerns a mass death. The consequenc-
es of the action are therefore more intense than in the 
case of a single fatal incident at work. The intensity of 
the effects is significant for our moral judgments  [5]. 
Thirdly, the person responsible for the miners going 
underground was aware of the elevated explosion haz-
ard, and analyses have shown that the controllability 
of factors contributes to a more severe judgment of the 
other person’s morality  [6]. Fourthly, approximately 
a half of all the study subjects declared that miners were 
part of their nearest social circle. The situation being 
assessed may have therefore affected their nearest and 
dearest directly.
The main research question is whether information 
about the perpetrator’s emotions and views (socially de-
sirable and undesirable ones) is important for the judg-
ment of morality from the onlooker’s point of view. Ac-
cording to the person-centered theory, we make moral 
judgments taking into account not only the action but 
the whole person [7]. The information about the perpe-
trator’s views and emotions was therefore expected to 
influence the judgment of morality, and the study sub-
jects were expected to judge more positively a perpetra-
tor feeling socially desirable emotions and expressing 
social desirable views because we prefer individuals 
who have the highest possible moral integrity [2,8–10]. 
So far, most research in the psychology of moral judg-
ments has focused on analyzing the behavior itself or 
the behavior and views of other people. Over the re-
cent years, however, the increasingly important role of 
including emotional aspects in research in the field of 
moral psychology has been emphasized  [11–14], and 
consequently this study also takes into account infor-
mation about the perpetrator’s emotions, apart from 
their behavior and views.
Moral integrity may concern 3 aspects of morality: 
behavior, views, and emotions [3]. This concept is relat-
ed to the assumption that morality is not only what we 
do but also what we think and what we feel. We have 
moral integrity for instance when we tell the truth, we 
believe that one should tell the truth, and we are happy 
about it. This is positive integrity (because this kind of 
morality is socially desirable). However, when we tell 
lies, we believe that lying is acceptable and we are hap-
py about it, we also have integrity, but it is negative be-
cause most societies believe lying to be undesirable in 
their value systems. This is the vertical integrity type 
described by Żylicz [15].
Lack of moral integrity is commonly referred to 
as “moral schizophrenia” [3]. It appears when there is 
inconsistency between 2 or 3 aspects of morality. For 
example, we believe telling lies to be unacceptable, we 
tell lies and we do not feel guilt. Other examples of the 
lack of moral integrity described in the psychological 
literature constitute the concept of bounded ethica- 
lity [16,17], moral hypocrisy [1,18], and ethical disso-
nance [2].
In the study discussed in this paper, the respondents 
were shown the 4 possible types of integrity and lack 
thereof, described further below. The expectation was 
that the study subjects would prefer socially desirable 
emotions and views, i.e., that the perpetrators display-
ing them would be judged as the most moral. Other 
research has shown that we perceive moral hypocri-
sy negatively  [19], and that we prefer individuals who 
have positive moral integrity  [3]. It was also assumed 
that socially desirable emotions would be preferred 
over socially undesirable ones. A  similar assumption 
was made in the case of views, which is rather obvious. 
A  number of studies emphasize the role of intention, 
feeling of guilt and apologies on the perpetrator’s part 
in the process of judging them [20–22]. It is therefore 
slightly more interesting to examine the preferences 
concerning socially (un)desirable emotions or socially 
(un)desirable views. Socially desirable views were ex-
pected to be more important for the study subjects than 
socially desirable emotions. This would be related to the 
fact that views are more stable and controllable than 
emotions, so we expect them to be more “appropriate” 
as compared to emotions [6].
Summing up, the following hypotheses were put 
forward in the research:
 ■ Hypothesis 1: The study subjects will judge as more 
moral the individual expressing socially desirable 
views and feeling socially desirable emotions vs. the 
other options.
 ■ Hypothesis 2: The study subjects will judge as more 
moral the individual expressing socially desira-
ble views and feeling socially undesirable emotions 
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vs. the individual feeling socially desirable emotions 
and expressing socially undesirable views.
 ■ Hypothesis 3: The study subjects will judge as the le-
ast moral the individual expressing socially undesira-
ble views and feeling socially undesirable emotions 
vs. the other options.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
The individuals participating in the incident (includ-
ing onlookers, the victims’ neighbors, people living in 
nearby housing estates and towns, people working at 
nearby companies in the area of the Silesian Province) 
were asked to judge the morality of the perpetrator 
responsible for the miners going underground in the 
“Mysłowice-Wesoła” mine, who had contributed to the 
miners’ death or injury. They were given 4 potential sit-
uations (stories) to judge, containing:
 ■ socially desirable views and emotions,
 ■ socially desirable views and socially undesirable 
emotions,
 ■ socially undesirable views and socially desirable 
emotions,
 ■ socially undesirable views and emotions.
The feeling of guilt was a socially desirable emotion, 
while the lack thereof was a  socially undesirable one. 
Information about the perpetrator’s conviction that the 
situation should not have happened (work should not 
have been continued if a more serious hazard was pres-
ent as compared to the ordinary conditions) represent-
ed a socially desirable view, while information that the 
perpetrator believed that the situation could take place 
(that it was acceptable to continue work under condi-
tions of elevated hazard) represented a  socially unde-
sirable view.
For example, one of the stories went as follows. 
“Imagine that an individual (a group) responsible for the 
miners going underground (the decision-makers) felt 
guilty as a result of the victims’ tragedy and believed that 
the situation should not have taken place (work should 
not have continued under conditions of elevated hazard). 
Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 7 the degree to which 
you consider this individual a moral person.”
The research procedure described in this paper was 
inspired by numerous studies by Wojciszke  [23] and 
Haidt [11,24] using a formula that involved presenting 
short stories to the study subject, asking them to judge 
the morality of the individuals the stories concerned. 
This is an example of a recognized approach in the psy-
chology of moral judgments.
The respondents judged morality on a scale of 0 to 7 
(with 0 meaning a very immoral individual and 7 mean-
ing a very moral individual). Each subject assessed 4 pos-
sible situations. Other aspects that were controlled were 
age, gender, province of residence, status of the subject 
(e.g.,  student, worker, unemployed person), as well as 
the subjects’ political views and whether they believed 
in and practiced a religion. The study subjects were also 
asked to state whether their closest family or friends in-
cluded or had included miners.
Research in the area of values indicates that mor-
al judgments depend on the degree of moral develop-
ment, which is connected with age in an obvious man-
ner [6,15]. Guided by our concern about the high inter-
nal and external accuracy of the research, we decided to 
invite young adults, i.e., people aged 20–30/35 years old 
to participate in it, following Bee [25]. We have limited 
ourselves to that age range because people included in it 
constitute a relatively homogeneous group which starts 
to perceive the ethical relativism of many aspects [26].
Two hundred sixty-two young working adults liv-
ing in Silesia took part in the anonymous research (age: 
mean (M) = 23.54, standard deviation (SD) = 2.41), of 
whom 67% were women (N = 174). The study subjects 
were working for various employers (a total of several 
dozen various companies). Seventy-one percent of the 
respondents were students and workers (N = 186) (the 
sample included students of state and private univer-
sities as well as post-secondary schools), and 30% were 
only workers (N = 76). The sample did not include min-
ers but 53% (N = 140) subjects declared that their clos-
est family/friends included or had included miners. It is 
worth emphasizing, however, that the closest relatives 
and friends of miners who had died as a result of the 
explosion described in the survey were not asked to fill 
out the questionnaire.
Eighty-six percent of the subjects declared them-
selves as Catholic believers  (N  =  217),  12%  as athe-
ists  (N = 31), 1% as Buddhists  (N = 3), and 1% as ag-
nostics  (N = 2). Nine persons did not respond to this 
question. All the atheists and agnostics in the sample 
had been raised in the Catholic faith. The subjects de-
clared an average degree of practicing religious ob-
servances (M = 3.66, SD = 2.37, median (Me) = 4) on 
a scale of 0–7 (0 – “I do not practice at all,” 7 – “I follow 
religious observances”).
When asked about their political views concerning 
economic matters, the subjects gave average respons-
es (M = 3.65, SD = 1.7, Me = 4) on a scale of 0–7 (0 – “The 
State’s involvement should be very limited,”  7  – “The 
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State’s involvement should be very high”). Their re-
sponses were similar when they were asked about their 
political views concerning social and cultural mat-
ters (M = 3.84, SD = 1.62, Me = 4) on a scale of 0–7 (0 – 
“Very conservative views,” 7 – “Very liberal views”).
RESULTS
A Friedman ANOVA test was carried out for the deriv-
ative measurements: Chi2 ANOVA (N = 262, df = 3) = 
543.4224, p < 0.001. The analysis confirmed the exis-
tence of significant differences between the stories. The 
Table 1 presents the mean and the standard deviation 
for all the stories, while the Figure 1 also contains data 
concerning the median value, and presents the results 
obtained in a visual form.
It was also checked whether additional variables con-
trolled in the study (age, gender, political views, belief in 
and practicing of a religion, having miners among closest 
family members/friends) had a significant influence on 
the results obtained (Mann-Whitney U test, Kruskal-Wal-
lis test). No significant results appeared in the analyses, 
which may be interpreted from the angle of universal-
ism in the expression of moral judgments in this area. 
Similar tendencies have been obtained in other studies [3].
DISCUSSION
Hypotheses 1 and 3 were confirmed in accordance with 
the expectations [3,6,19]. It turns out that the informa-
tion about the socially desirable views and emotions of 
the individual responsible for the miners’ death leads to 
a significantly more positive judgment of that person’s 
morality, while information about the socially undesir-
able views and emotions of the individual responsible 
for the miners’ death leads to a significantly more neg-
ative judgment of that person’s morality. Both the first 
and the last story differed significantly from all the oth-
ers at the level of p < 0.001. 
The hypothesis 2 was not confirmed, however, mean-
ing that there was no difference for the study subjects 
between socially desirable views and emotions (as well 
as undesirable views and emotions). In other words: the 
sole information about socially desirable emotions will 
not contribute to a significantly more positive judgment 
of the morality of the given individual, nor will the sole 
information on desirable views. In turn, the sole infor-
mation about socially undesirable emotions will not con-
tribute to a significantly more negative judgment of the 
morality of the given individual, and nor will the sole 
information on undesirable views. Only the provision 
of information about socially desirable (or undesirable) 
views and emotions at the same time contributes to a sig-
nificantly more positive (or negative) judgment of the 
morality of the perpetrator of the specific behavior.
Table 1. Stories’ method in the study of young adult (N = 262) 
working Silesians, who were reading various stories about  
a perpetrator responsible for the death of subordinates  
at the workplace
Story
Perpetrator’s morality 
scale
[pts]
M SD
A – story including emotions and views 
socially desired
4.24 1.74
B – story including socially desired views 
and socially undesired emotions
1.92 1.43
C – story including socially undesired views 
and socially desired emotions
1.93 1.41
D – story including emotions and views 
socially undesired
0.53 0.79
M – mean, SD – standard deviation.
min. – minimal value, max – maximal value.
A – story including emotions and views socially desired.
B – story including socially desired views and socially undesired emotions.
C – story including socially undesired views and socially desired emotions.
D – story including emotions and views socially undesired.
Fig. 1. Boxplot with stories’ method in the study of young adult 
(N = 262) working Silesians, who were reading various stories 
about a perpetrator responsible for the death of subordinates  
at the workplace
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CONCLUSIONS
Although there may exist a widespread conviction about 
the significant role of behavior only when it comes to 
moral judgments, the latest research points to some ad-
ditional aspects that influence our judgments concern-
ing morality  [3,11–14]. This paper describes 2 of them: 
the views expressed and the emotions felt by the individ-
ual responsible for the miners’ fatal accident at work, as 
those having a significant influence on the perception of 
that person’s morality. This data is consistent with the re-
sults confirming this tendency in the case of violation of 
other norms, such as “you shall not steal,” “you shall not 
cheat on your partner,” and “you shall not tell lies” [3]. 
Working young adults in Poland expressed a signifi-
cantly more positive judgment of the morality of the 
individual feeling guilty after the miners’ death or inju-
ry and who believed at the same time that the situation 
should not have taken place (that work should not have 
been continued under conditions of an elevated haz-
ard). That individual’s views and emotions were there-
fore desirable from the social point of view. It is worth 
emphasizing, however, that the same individual’s mo-
rality was perceived significantly more positively by the 
study subjects only if the latter had information about 
socially desirable views and socially desirable emotions 
at the same time. Information provided only about so-
cially desirable views or only about emotions did not 
have such a strong influence on the change of the judg-
ment of the perpetrator’s morality. 
This tendency also worked in the opposite direction: 
socially undesirable views and emotions led to a signifi-
cantly less positive judgment of the perpetrator’s mo-
rality. It turns out, therefore, that the act itself is not 
the only significant piece of information taken into ac-
count by the study subjects when judging the morality 
of the miners’ supervisor. 
The above findings are important for several rea-
sons. First of all, we make moral judgments every day, 
especially at work [4,6]. Secondly, it is natural for us to 
perceive people in moral (community) terms and in 
terms of agency (competencies/success), which Woj- 
ciszke has demonstrated many times in his research, 
also with his team  [23]. Thirdly, our moral decisions 
(and consequently our system of values) influence many 
areas of our life, such as the election of political can-
didates [27,28], the quality of business behavior or the 
choice of one’s life partner [29]. What is more, the way 
in which we perceive other people’s intentions influenc-
es even our altruistic behavior [30]. Fourthly, the analy-
sis of the aspects significant for the judgment of the mo-
rality of key people at a company may have a significant 
influence on the latter’s development, on the employees’ 
sense of justice, on the feeling that human resources are 
being managed efficiently, on the image of the company 
in the local and global environment, etc.
The practical implications of the results obtained are 
related mainly to the perception of the managerial staff 
at the company in critical situations. It is important to 
inform the employees and other interested individuals 
about the socially desirable views and emotions of the 
persons responsible for the given situation because this 
will reduce the severity of the moral judgment and may 
alleviate the anxiety connected with the relevant crisis. 
Further studies are required in this field, however. 
It is worth emphasizing that even though a half of 
the study subjects had miners among their nearest and 
dearest, no differences appeared between that group 
and the other study subjects. This means that working 
individuals perceive the moral aspects that were stud-
ied in a similar way, regardless of whether their closest 
family members or friends included miners who may 
have found themselves in a similar situation.
It is extremely important to carry out further anal-
yses taking into account other critical situations in 
companies and situations when other ethical standards 
are violated. It is worth studying the nuances that may 
appear depending on the type of behavior. Various in-
dividuals could also be analyzed, judged from the point 
of view of their place within the organization (e.g., the 
president, the managerial staff,  etc.), and the various 
types of businesses and their sizes could be taken into 
account. 
It would also be interesting to expand the research 
to take into account additional variables pertaining to 
the study subject, such as personality traits, political 
views, the system of values, and an in-depth analysis 
of the individual’s moral functioning. It would also be 
significant to expand the sample by adding other (es-
pecially older) age groups as well as to compare the ex-
tent to which judgments of the individuals involved in 
the situation differ from judgments of individuals from 
other provinces of Poland, without the social identity 
context of the Silesian Province.
The study’s limitations include above all the par-
ticular sample comprising people living in the Silesian 
region, for whom mining disasters are particularly sig-
nificant. The “Mysłowice-Wesoła” mine is considered 
the most dangerous mine in the region. It is not with-
out importance that the said individuals were Catho-
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lic believers. On the other hand, similar research was 
carried out concerning the judgment of the morality of 
the perpetrators of the Boeing  777  crash on a  Polish, 
Spanish, Czech, and Chinese sample, yielding similar 
results [3], which may prove the universality of express-
ing such moral judgments. It would therefore be worth 
conducting further research on samples from various 
countries, with control of cultural variables.
Furthermore, the methodology of the studies carried 
out may be problematic due to the fact that every study 
subject read all 4 stories. It seems more appropriate to 
use an experimental method involving every subject 
reading only 1 story. Paruzel-Czachura carried out re-
search in 2016, controlling the method of obtaining the 
results in the questionnaire and in the experiment (with 
one study subject reading only a single story). It turned 
out that the same results were obtained in both meth-
ods with regard to the judgment concerning the most 
moral and least moral individuals. The said research 
concerned the situation of judging a cheating partner [3].
To conclude, it is worth pointing out that the study 
subjects obtained information not only about the be-
havior of the individual being judged but also about the 
emotions felt and the views expressed by the latter. This 
situation may seem artificial from the point of view of 
day-to-day life. It has to be pointed out, however, that 
even if we do not have access to other people’s views 
and emotions, we still make certain assumptions to 
that effect, and these assumptions influence our moral 
judgments [6].
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